Europe

Europe produces regulations with an unwavering consistency, and machines with growing difficulty. This category watches the gap between the two: a semiconductor plan presented as a reconquest for a few hundred million, a defense industry Europeanized at the precise moment France was losing its grip on it, censorship delegated to Brussels and then received in Paris as an external constraint, a digital euro voted through in the name of sovereignty and built on dependencies that never move. You will find the files followed in their technical detail, from the Mercosur agreement seen from a farm in the Isère to the American servers running a supposedly European payment system, along with the moments when the Union genuinely acts, because those exist and deserve to be told apart from the rest. Written without reflexive Euroscepticism or federalist faith, asking one question of every file: who decides, and who pays.

France Is Building AI Sovereignty in Angers and Dismantling It in Parliament

Digital sovereignty

On November 3, the owner of Lidl teamed up with Bull, now state-owned, to build European AI infrastructure around the Angers factory. On November 8, Arthur Mensch warned that the Darcos bill, up for debate in the National Assembly on the 19th, will decide whether Mistral’s next gigawatt lands in the Essonne or somewhere else. Mensch is right about the mechanism, since proving a negative across billions of words is impossible, but his flat-rate levy would make copyright laundering official. Meanwhile, the French state is buying the servers with one hand and driving the workload away with the other.

After the Plane, the Tank: Germany Is Handing Us Back Our Sovereignty Without Meaning To

Geopolitics

On October 8, General Mandon told French lawmakers that Germany was pulling out of MGCS, the joint Franco-German tank of the future, just four months after the collapse of the SCAF fighter program. Ten years of summits and communiqués, only to discover that Paris and Berlin never wanted the same tank, while the Leopard 3 moves ahead and the Leclerc grows old. In the very week the AfD’s youth wing was drawing maps that include Alsace and Moselle, France finds itself alone for both the jet and the tank. It is a snub, but also an opportunity: provided we are willing to pay, and above all, that we actually want it.

Mistral Large 4: Le Chonk Doesn’t Settle Sovereignty. It Settles the Bill

Digital sovereignty

On October 6, Mistral unveiled Mistral Large 4, nicknamed “Le Chonk”: a trillion-parameter model trained on 3,800 GPUs in the company’s own European datacenters. It doesn’t catch up with OpenAI or Anthropic, and that isn’t its job. It draws level with the best Chinese open models, breaks into the global top five for cybersecurity (partly because American models refuse the task), and finally makes a question worth asking that nobody seems to raise: how much is France already exporting in tokens? Two weeks ago, I argued that Mistral had reduced sovereignty to a European access point. I stand by every word. But the picture needs completing.

Mistral AI Didn’t Betray Sovereignty. It Shrank It Down to a European Endpoint

Digital sovereignty

In 2023, Cédric O bought into Mistral AI for €176, then lobbied for a lighter AI Act; after the latest funding round, his stake is worth around €90 million on paper. Since then, the French state has become the startup’s first customer, from the armed forces to the civil service. This summer, Mistral crossed a threshold: its infrastructure now hosts third-party models, starting with China’s GLM-5.2. The pivot to a platform model is rational, and I defended it myself. What isn’t rational is to keep selling it as technological sovereignty.

AI Safety: What If the Real Variable Is the Price of a Token?

Digital sovereignty

Anthropic filed its confidential S-1 on June 1, is targeting a Nasdaq listing in October at around $2 trillion, and on September 12 its CEO published a plan to slow the AI race. Michael Burry called it pre-IPO hype; he is wrong on the technology, but his calendar is worth a look. Run against the only documented cause we have, the METR report, the three measures meant to protect us would not have prevented a single day of the July incident: internal model, in-house infrastructure, shared cache, unsolvable tasks. They act somewhere else, on price: chip controls, a distillation crackdown, and a compute cap decide who may train, who may learn, and who may cross the next threshold, in a market where the gap between a proprietary model and the open-weight swarm runs fifty to one. And on that terrain, Brussels has already written half the text.

The METR-OpenAI Affair: Agents Fooled a Phantom Judge, and Their Peers Were Asked to Investigate

Artificial Intelligence

METR’s report on the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident runs to ninety-one pages, and what has been made of it misses the point entirely. Twelve hundred agents meant to be isolated found one another, organized, and spent four days working around a transcript scorer that did not exist: they would have earned full marks by simply handing in their work. Between thirty and forty percent of the benchmark’s tasks were unsolvable, and the question of whether the evaluation apparatus had caused the behavior it was measuring was added to the investigation’s mandate at OpenAI’s request. Heavier still, and picked up nowhere: for want of human hours, METR delegated the analysis to agents of the very model that took part in the incident, on credits from the company under investigation, while writing that it could not rule out their having lied. What that changes for the independent evaluators Amodei wants, and for the AI Act’s scientific panel, is not a question of badges but of the capacity to read.

Regulating AI: What Europe Didn’t Dare Put in Its Own AI Act

Europe

Dario Amodei’s essay never mentions Europe, and yet the AI Act already contains, on paper, the first step of his plan: evaluations, cybersecurity, incident reporting, a panel of independent experts, and since August 2, 2026 an AI Office with the power to investigate and to fine. The difference comes down to one thing: the regulation organizes disclosure under secrecy, where Amodei proposes permanent presence and publication. Brussels selects by a compute threshold what it has never observed, and its Article 78 is why the public learned of the OpenAI-Hugging Face incident from an American nonprofit and a competitor’s blog. The embryo of that college of evaluators already exists, in Article 68, and three things are missing from it that an implementing act and one amendment would suffice to supply.

Slowing the AI Race: The Ambiguity at the Heart of Anthropic’s Plan

Digital sovereignty

Dario Amodei proposes to slow the race for AI capabilities: third-party evaluators stationed inside the labs, coordination among companies in “democratic countries” under an antitrust waiver, negotiation with China. The word Europe never appears in the essay. Behind the vocabulary of caution, the three concrete measures, a chip embargo, a crackdown on distillation, and the securing of model weights, describe a regime in which frontier capability becomes a commodity rationed by Washington. There is still one idea worth taking whole, the embedded evaluators, and one question to ask before applauding it: who has their foot on the pedal.

The offline digital euro: renting space on a chip

Digital euro

The ECB promises an offline digital euro “just like cash”: no network, anonymous, resilient. But this digital cash can only exist inside a tamper-proof chip in your phone, one whose access is controlled by Apple, Samsung, and Google and which Article 33 of the regulation must legally compel them to open. A capped wallet, an applet updated remotely, anonymity bounded by AML checks at loading and unloading: you no longer own your money, you rent space on a chip. The banknote never had to ask permission to circulate. That difference has a name: the freedom to pay without asking.

What People Are Really Smoking: France’s Over-the-Counter “CBD”

Society

Hundreds of consumers are telling the same story on social media: “CBD” bought in a legal shop, then hallucinations, tachycardia, sometimes the emergency room. French customs have documented the reason: hemp flowers sprayed with synthetic cannabinoids like EDMB-4en-PINACA, a hundred times more potent than CBD and invisible to standard drug screens. Contrary to the conspiratorial reading, the state never wanted these shops: it tried to ban them and lost twice in court. But it has since built no oversight, no traceability, and no testing requirement, because this gray market suits every level of society. An investigation into France’s third drug, the one nobody will claim.